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China’s Development Finance: What
Issues for Reporting and Monitoring
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Jiajun Xu and Richard Carey
Abstract This article explores the implications of China’s rise for global reporting and monitoring systems
(RMSs) in the field of development cooperation. Beyond its fast-growing – albeit still modest – foreign aid,
China has emerged in the last decade as a globally pre-eminent source of development finance. While
China’s endeavours are comparable to previous rising powers that strived to build linkages into global
commodity chains and to participate in advanced industrial and technology value creation, what makes China
distinct from OECD capital providers is its unprecedented scale, cohesive state-market banking and
enterprise institutions, and extensive utilisation of official finance for risk-taking. This poses an existential
crisis for DAC’s ODA reporting system, helping to precipitate a wide-ranging renovation process. Hence,
China’s intentions and capacities regarding the reporting and monitoring of its development finance have a
potentially formative influence on the development of a new, wider DAC reporting system and on other
international RMSs in the development finance field as well.
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1 Introduction
The landscape of development finance is
transforming in several dimensions, posing
unprecedented challenges to existing reporting
and monitoring systems (RMSs) and fostering
multiplying initiatives.
First, official development assistance (ODA) is
undergoing a triple revolution of objectives, players
and instruments (Severino and Ray 2009: 1), in a
world of low interest rates, triggering an ODA
identity crisis and a wide-ranging renovation of
the OECD-DAC reporting system (OECD 2012).
Second, the emerging Post-2015 Development
Agenda calls for an integrated approach to
sustainable development, raising challenging
questions on the interface between the climate
finance system and the development finance
system (United Nations General Assembly 2013).
Third, renewed focus has been given to the
‘catalytic’ role of public finance in leveraging
private capital for long-term investments to
overcome market failure (G20/OECD 2013;
World Bank 2013a), challenging current
arrangements for addressing debt sustainability
and avoiding crass competition among providers
of long-term finance (Xu and Carey 2013).
Hence the search for viable RMSs is intensifying,
as part and parcel of overall development finance
governance regimes, for purposes of burden-
sharing and target-monitoring, transparency and
accountability, mutual disciplines and
multilateral surveillance, and so forth.
In this larger picture, China’s rise as a
development financer has heightened the need for
deciphering the new shape of development
finance, including its magnitude and nature;
evaluating its development impacts; improving
policy coordination among creditors on quality
standards and loan subsidies; and strengthening
financial integrity to ensure debt sustainability
and good governance of resource revenues.
Looking ahead, the prospect that China will be a
pre-eminent capital supplier on a sustained basis
highlights its potential formative influence in the
development of global RMSs (World Bank 2013b).
This article aims to examine the potential role of
China in emerging global reporting and
monitoring systems. It will proceed as follows:
first, it examines the scale, scope and nature of
China’s development finance abroad, and then
analyses China’s capacity and willingness to work
towards more transparency; second, it assesses
China’s (potential) attitude towards the OECD-
Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
reporting system, the UN South–South
Development Cooperation (SSDC) information
platform, global transparency initiatives and
export-credit disciplines; finally, it identifies the
high stakes China has in a well-governed
development finance system and the key
challenges ahead in renovating global RMSs.
2 Defining and tracking China’s development
finance1
Beginning around 2000, China has emerged as a
pre-eminent supplier of finance to the world,
including to developing countries (Bräutigam
2009; Lin 2012). Chinese finance for
infrastructure development, notably power and
transportation, has risen with extraordinary
rapidity (Foster et al. 2009). And beyond that,
there has been a new and rapidly growing flow of
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), both
from large state-owned enterprises and private
companies, but also from thousands of smaller
private Chinese businesses seeking new
opportunities against a background of
competitive pressures and rising real wages in
the Chinese market (Gu 2009; Shen 2013).
It is clear that China’s policy banks and Chinese
firms, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private
enterprises, large and small, have become major
players in financing development, via developing
infrastructure and resource supply chains, just as
previous rising powers have strived to build
linkages into global commodity chains and to
participate in advanced industrial and technology
value creation. This burgeoning activity goes a
long way beyond China’s aid programme as such,
giving rise to much confusion on the magnitude
and scope of China’s aid – what is China’s
foreign aid and what is the footprint of loans and
investments from Chinese state-owned banks
and enterprises, and what is the association of
Chinese outbound FDI with Chinese policies and
instruments (Bräutigam 2010).
It is essential then to distinguish between China’s
aid programme and its much larger financial
footprint in developing countries in the form of
non-concessional lending and FDI. Here we
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attempt to relate these various strands and policy
issues to the larger international policy debates on
aid and development finance under way in various
fora, looking successively at China’s official aid
programme, China’s larger financial footprint in
developing countries and various attempts to
measure it, and finally at the global
macroeconomic and structural dimensions of
China’s development financing, past and potential.
2.1 China’s foreign aid programme
China’s external official development assistance
programme, as described in the 2011 White
Paper (Information Office of the State Council
2011), is recognisable as an ODA-like
programme, with three elements; grants,
interest-free loans and concessional loans. The
grants and interest-free loans are coordinated by
the Department of Foreign Aid in the Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM), while the concessional
loans are managed by the EximBank, which
borrows the funds and re-lends to developing
countries at a concessional rate, with the interest
rate subsidy provided for in the budget of
MOFCOM. An Inter-ministerial Coordination
Mechanism led by the Ministry of Commerce
brings together all the sectoral ministries
involved, with policies and financing decided at
the level of the State Council. The Economic
Counsellors in Chinese embassies coordinate
action at the field level.2
From the annual reports of MOFCOM,
Bräutigam has identified the size of the foreign
aid budget at US$2.5 billion in 2011 (Bräutigam
2011a). However, for concessional loans, this
includes only the interest rate subsidies. Taking
the DAC reporting practice of counting
concessional loans at their full face value, as long
as the grant element exceeds 25 per cent,
Bräutigam multiples up MOFCOM interest
subsidies to estimate that the DAC equivalent of
the Chinese foreign aid programme is in the
order of US$10.5 billion for 2011 (ibid.). The
current efforts by Chinese aid officials to identify
more comprehensively the new and ongoing aid
activities of various ministries and agencies are
likely to add to this figure (Li et al., this
IDS Bulletin). In addition, it is known that the
programme has been expanding rapidly,
although its growth is now subject to
implementation capacity constraints.
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Box 1 Tracking and estimating the scale of China’s development finance
Given the diversity of the overall supply of development financing from China and the
relative weakness of statistical systems, there have been a number of initiatives to estimate
its overall scale. AidData has assembled a system focused on ODA-like flows that is driven
by news reports (Strange et al. 2013). The Rand Corporation has developed a system that
attempts to capture a comprehensive aggregate covering China’s Foreign Aid and
Government-sponsored Investment Activities (FAGIA), using methodology developed by the
Congressional Research Service (Wolf, Wang and Warner 2013). Like the AidData system,
this relies heavily on computer searches of news databases. The fundamental problem with
these methodologies is that they essentially pick up a very large component of noise
generated by entrepreneurial activity. Thus the numbers generated are very high and
duplicative of the various stages of ideas, proposals, Memorandums-of-Understanding,
implementation and completion, with huge lags involved and many ideas never followed
through into operational form. The Rand survey, for example, estimates Chinese FAGIA to
Africa at a cumulative US$180 billion from 2001–11. But tracing these numbers through to
delivery on a comprehensive basis is impossible in practice, even with the most assiduous
‘crowd-sourcing’ to correct the initial array of numbers. Hence these surveys run the risk of
distorting popular debate and even analytical work (Bräutigam 2013; AidData 2013).
The Heritage Foundation has a series on foreign investment deals that is anchored in
precise transactions and their progress (Heritage Foundation 2013). The World Bank
Building Bridges Report used news coverage to help identify precise projects, captured in
the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database (World
Bank 2013c). Another study (Shen 2013) also made use of the Chinese investment
approvals database, double-checked with African countries (the checking process revealed
large underestimation of Chinese FDI involving smaller enterprises).
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2.2 China’s development financing beyond
concessional aid
China has an array of major state-owned banks
which are active in developing countries, making
loans on a non-concessional basis, which go well
beyond the scope of DAC paradigms and
reporting systems (Bräutigam 2011b). The
EximBank is a key institution here. Its
concessional lending is only a small part of its
overall financing activities involving projects in
developing countries.
Alongside the EximBank is the China
Development Bank (CDB), also founded in 1994,
but focused on domestic lending. Over recent
years, however, it has rapidly expanded its
activities in developing countries (Sanderson and
Forsythe 2012; Li, Preble and Sesia 2011). Thus
China has two major state banks of global scale
and reach, which provide development financing
outside of China’s aid programme. Other state-
owned banks are also active in the field.
From one perspective, this non-concessional
lending by state-owned banks is facilitated by
implicit state guarantees and could be considered
as analogous to the Other Official Financing
(OOF) category in the DAC reporting system or
OOF-like. The CDB is structured in a way not
dissimilar to the KfW in Germany, for example.
An even wider circle of Chinese development
finance outside of the foreign aid programme
could be drawn to include the commercial
activities of SOEs in developing countries, which
are active in infrastructure investments and
acquisitions as joint venture partners or on a
wholly-owned basis (Lin and Wang 2014).
From another perspective, the Chinese system is
highly decentralised, with many of the enterprises
involved based in provinces and cities and having
a high degree of autonomy and initiative. Many
have also accumulated large financial reserves.
In summary, Chinese development financing and
investment capacities have strengthened
enormously in the last decade, so that China is
now able to provide long-term development
finance on a large scale, thus contributing to
meeting a huge systemic challenge that has
gained prominence in the work of the G20, the
OECD and the World Bank (G20/OECD 2013).
Indeed some of the techniques used by China
(drawing on China’s own experience with
Japanese financial assistance in the initial
reform era), such as resource-based financing
arrangements are now recognised as an
alternative way of providing long-term finance by
the World Bank (World Bank 2013a: 35; Halland
and Canuto 2013).
2.3 Macroeconomic and structural dimensions
In terms of the macroeconomic and structural
dimensions of the Chinese development
financing capacity, the key point is the vulnerable
position of China as the world’s largest exporter
of capital. China’s exports of capital are a
counterpart to the structural savings deficit in
the USA made possible by the role of the dollar
as the main reserve currency (McKinnon 2013).
And as an exporter of capital, China needs to
have the financial institutions and commercial
enterprises able to invest its very large foreign
exchange reserves in real assets that provide real
returns in a reliable flow over the coming
decades (Yu 2013). And China’s interest in
investing in the global supply of commodities
and establishing secure supply chains is
providing a whole new environment for
commodity exporting developing countries (and
developed commodity exporters as well). Thus,
these macroeconomic and structural dimensions
of China’s development financing give China a
strong interest in shaping and supporting
international transparency and accountability
regimes that help to assure financial and fiscal
integrity and the effective functioning of states
and markets, and thus China’s future revenue
streams and supply arrangements (Yu 2013).
Various elements of the G20 work programme, in
which China is a committed participant, reflect
the recognition of these issues (Yu 2004).
2.4 Transparency: China’s intent and capacity
To what extent then, is China willing and/or able
to work towards more transparency about its
development finance? Historically, China’s
foreign assistance has been driven by foreign
policy objectives (as is the case with other aid
providers) and part of the dynamics of South–
South Development Cooperation (SSDC), albeit
now undergoing profound changes (Tan-Mullins,
Mohan and Power 2010). Initially since the
financial flows were relatively small and the
projects were rather ad hoc, China saw little
rationale behind ‘aid transparency’ as framed by
the DAC with its distinct traditions and
terminologies (Grimm et al. 2011: 27).
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As its aid programme expands under a
strengthened coordination mechanism and rising
budget envelope China has increasingly shown
interest in collecting and publicising data on its
aid, understood as those elements of its
development finance comparable to the ODA
concept and measures of the OECD/DAC.
First, the fast-growing foreign aid programme
creates a demand for transparency and
accountability. As highlighted by the then Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao in the National Foreign Aid
Conference in 2010, there comes with this growth
in the Chinese aid programme the need to
‘establish internal audit and external oversight
mechanisms’ and to ‘build more rigorous,
efficient, and open foreign aid institutional
mechanisms’ (Xinhua 2010). China’s first White
Paper on Foreign Aid issued in 2011 was
primarily driven by this objective to improve its
aid effectiveness (Information Office of the State
Council 2011). A second more comprehensive
White Paper is expected to take this effort
further and to outline future endeavours to build
development finance transparency systems and
propose annual reports on foreign aid.
Second, reputational factors have persuaded
China to publish more to protect its
international image and dispel rumours and
misgivings. External pressures for transparency
come from non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and social networks more generally,
which have more resources and more cyberspace
than ever before. The Global Campaign for Aid
Transparency resorts to ‘name and shame’ to
encourage all public and private providers of
development assistance to make their activities
transparent. It publishes an Aid Transparency Index
where China’s MOFCOM ranks at the bottom in
the ‘very poor’ category (Publish What You Fund
2013). In addition, Chinese researchers have
shown steeply increased interest in the
transparency agenda (Grimm et al. 2011: 23).
However, China’s nascent willingness to publish
its foreign aid data unilaterally does not
necessarily lead to its direct participation in
international reporting systems.
First, China officially identifies itself with the
SSDC tradition to avoid prematurely assuming
undue aid burdens given the daunting domestic
development challenges; thus, China insists that
‘North–South cooperation remains as the core of
the global development partnership and
South–South cooperation is a useful supplement
to North–South cooperation’ (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2013).
Second, China desires to retain its policy
autonomy to use alternative financial
instruments. As with other emerging powers,
China has not been a party to the definition of
ODA and the DAC’s development finance
reporting systems – a process of constant
political contestation and deliberation among
traditional donors (Xu 2014). Thus, China is
uncertain about whether compliance with a
common benchmark would constrain its ability
to pursue alternative development philosophies
and practices. But in order to understand the
OECD rules, Chinese officials have in fact
followed closely the substance and evolution of
the DAC reporting system and related issues of
aid untying and export credits. The existence of
an informal China–DAC Study Group since 2009
has facilitated growing interaction between
Chinese and DAC experts and officials,
including on statistical issues.
Apart from the intent, capacity plays an equally
important role in the pace of China’s moves
towards more transparency. China is still at the
early stages of building a sophisticated statistical
system (Zhou 2012: 160). Thus, its capacity
building for data reporting is in its infancy.
Moreover, China faces coordination challenges
among various ministries that provide foreign aid
(Grimm et al. 2011: 13), although an interagency
coordination mechanism was created in 2011
(Information Office of the State Council 2011).
3 China in a world of multiplying agendas and
initiatives
Here we focus on how China positions itself in
relation to alternative RMSs including the
OECD-DAC reporting system, the emerging
UN-SSDC information platform and global
transparency initiatives.3
3.1 Chinese development finance and the renovation
of the DAC reporting systems
The scale and scope of China’s development
finance as described above is one of the main
drivers of the current effort in the DAC to
rethink its basic concepts of development finance.
Emerging from its High Level Meeting in London
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in December 2012, with China attending as an
observer, the DAC agreed to explore more deeply
the potential of the ‘vast changes to the
development financing landscape’. Within this
broad mandate the DAC is tasked with
elaborating a new measure of ‘total official
support for development’ (OECD 2012). The
OECD Secretariat has outlined what a more
comprehensive reporting system on development
and climate finance could look like (OECD
Development Co-operation Directorate 2013).
A proximate cause of the ODA’s ‘identity crisis’
(Xu and Carey 2013) is the initiative of a
number of OECD state development banks to
exploit the low interest rate environment by
raising funds on financial markets at low cost,
using implicit or explicit state guarantees, and
re-lending to developing countries without any
tangible and explicit fiscal effort. In effect, this
practice resembles the flexibility of China’s state
banks in financing developing country projects
and programmes.
Yet such lending with zero fiscal transfer is highly
problematic in the mainstream mentality of the
DAC reporting rules for ODA, which are
primarily focused on measuring comparable donor
efforts for the purpose of burden-sharing and target-
monitoring towards aid commitments. Hence, such
a ‘commercial logic’ is criticised as a negation of
the moral sense of aid-giving (OECD 2012).
Furthermore, the DAC reporting rules have limited
donors’ capacity to provide harder loans. To
maximise resource transfer, DAC established a
core eligibility test of development loans – a
minimum grant element of 25 per cent at the level
of each transaction and a minimum grant element
of 86 per cent at the overall aid programme level.
Given limited fiscal resources, these reporting rules
effectively incentivised donors to provide loans that
can qualify as ‘ODA’. Hence, it has created, as
intended, convergence pressures on donors to offer
highly concessional loans or outright grants, for
harder loans can only be ‘released’ by putting much
softer loans/grants into aid programmes.
Last but not least, the ODA concept is based on
a ‘net cash-flow’ principle that fails to give credit
to financial instruments (e.g. guarantees and
insurance) that can catalyse and leverage private
financing. Chinese state-owned entities do
benefit from implicit state guarantees and from
the ample financial reserves that many have
been able to acquire. This has helped them to
take on the risks involved in investment in areas
of contested governance or remote locations
(usually in association with resource-backed
repayment arrangements but these are still
vulnerable to non-performance).
In a nutshell, the existing DAC reporting system
has favoured grants over loans, softer loans over
harder ones, and explicit flows over implicit
guarantees. These favoured practices have been
further legitimised and routinised by regular peer
review processes to be spread as ‘best practices’
among DAC donors.
However, China as a former aid recipient does not
share DAC’s founding principles and political
framework. In fact, it frames its development
finance not as a welfare transfer but as a toolkit to
incubate and cultivate investment opportunities
for ‘mutual benefits’ (Information Office of the
State Council 2011). Moreover, as a latecomer,
China maintains that there is a legitimate space
to have more flexibility to deploy public finance,
as DAC donors did in their catching-up process, to
fill the gap left by traditional donors in long-term
financing such as infrastructure investments
(World Bank 2013a: 19).
Nevertheless, China is moving to increase its
interaction with the DAC, which itself is working
to become more inclusive. Although it did not, in
the event, attend the April 2014 Mexico City High
Level Meeting of the post-Busan Global
Partnership for Effective Development
Cooperation, China is showing its interest in
development effectiveness work as its aid
programme expands and its wider involvement in
development performance and outcomes
increases.
3.2 Regrouping on South–South Development
Cooperation?
The phenomenon of ‘emerging providers’ of
development finance has scaled up well beyond
the frontiers of traditional SSDC focused on
relatively low-cost technical cooperation. A
renewed SSDC framework would need ‘to
improve the transparency of their development
cooperation data and strengthen their
monitoring and evaluation systems to provide
better evidence on South–South Flows’, which
involves ‘one or more’ platforms for ‘the
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definition and measurement of the effectiveness,
quality and impact’ of their programmes
(Besharati 2013: 3).
The question becomes whether the time is ripe
to develop a distinct SSDC reporting system.
On the one hand, a global reporting system
seems to make it difficult, if not impossible, to
reconcile the ‘altruistic’ rhetoric of traditional
donors with the ‘mutual benefits’ approach of
emerging ones. Guided by the principle of one-
way altruistic assistance, the DAC reporting
system seeks to deduct any amount that benefits
donors even in indirect ways. For instance, it took
approximately one year to negotiate to what
extent contributions to the Global
Environmental Fund (GEF) could be counted as
ODA since donors could derive benefits from
environmental protection even though these
investments are made in developing countries
(the agreed solution was to count only 87.5 per
cent of GEF contributions as ODA). And under
the Clean Development Mechanism, the DAC
rules that any financial returns are to be
deducted from ODA.
On the other hand, strong political drivers for
establishing an SSDC reporting system are not
yet on the horizon. Any sustainable statistical
reporting and monitoring system is a major long-
term undertaking, requiring ongoing governance
systems for setting definitions and standards,
establishing reporting responsibilities and
conducting regular peer review of reporting
performance. All this requires resources –
financial, human and organisational – and most
importantly, political drivers to support such
systems. Looking ahead, the launch of the new
BRICS Development Bank will inevitably attract
international attention and require a
corresponding level of transparency. This might
help gather political momentum towards an
SSDC reporting platform.
In practice, reporting on SSDC is building up
within both the DAC reporting system (some
24 non-DAC members now provide reporting)
and the UN Development Cooperation Forum
(DCF). The DCF is working to develop
South–South and triangular cooperation as a
major element of its mandate, seeking to
facilitate policy dialogue on how to systemise the
institutional, policy and technical practices of
SSDC and its impact on development (United
Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs 2013). Thus, a further stream of
monitoring and learning seems set to emerge in
the new global development cooperation scenery.
In addition comes the proposal to form a new
Future International Cooperation Policy Network
(FICPN) to generate interaction between
research institutes of the BRICS Summit
members and other rising powers, and with
OECD-based institutes, to share new
development experiences acquired in recent
decades in emerging countries (see the IDS
Rising Powers in International Development
Programme).4
3.3 Opting into transparency and financial integrity
initiatives?
Transparency systems that allow wide access to
detailed data at the transactions level have
emerged as an approach to governance problems
in the flow of resources to developing countries.
Among these burgeoning initiatives, we focus on
two examples: one for aid flows, the International
Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), and the other
for resource revenues, the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI). Despite their
distinct methodologies and governance
arrangements, in common they are both voluntary
systems for information disclosure. The question
faced by China is whether it will voluntarily join
these transparency initiatives, or be co-opted to
do so.
The International Aid Transparency Initiative
operates by setting two reporting standards,
(i) for organisational level reporting on forward
planning budgets and recipients, with links to
related organisational documents and (ii) for
activity level reporting, including identification and
classification of activities and on outputs and
outcomes, with again links activity level
documentation. Activity classifications are largely
drawn from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS)
of the DAC. Participating organisations agree to
meet these two reporting standards and to make
the information generated by them publicly
available by linking them into the IATI registry.
The IATI registry does not upload these data, but
rather provides a central site where they can be
accessed via the internet by users (developing
country aid managers, aid policymakers and staff
more generally, civil society organisations (CSOs),
citizens, journalists and development researchers).
Xu and Carey China’s Development Finance: What Issues for Reporting and Monitoring Systems?108
2Gu&Carty IDSB45.4.qxd  24/06/2014  10:51  Page 108
A multi-stakeholder steering committee
consisting of donors, developing countries, CSOs
and aid experts provides the governance system.
Operationally, the initiative is led by the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with
logistical support from the United Nations Office
for Project Services (UNOPS), and technical
support on contract from a development
consulting firm (IATI 2013).
The frontline beneficiaries of the IATI are, first,
the providers of the data, since in practice it
turns out that many aid agencies have benefited
from upgrading their management information
systems under the IATI standards; second, the
countries receiving aid, since they are getting
access to forward data from a much greater
range of providers, including official and CSOs,
than before, with geo-coding also in view; third,
parliaments, CSOs and journalists; and not least,
development research institutions, which are
able to access the information in the database
and aggregate and analyse it from many angles.
Despite all these potential benefits, China and
many other emerging donors have not signalled
an interest in joining IATI. It would require from
them a major administrative effort with a high-
level political impulse which may not match
current priorities for developing aid
programmes. But in India, an Indian thinktank is
creating an Indian development cooperation
database in IATI format with the approval of the
Indian authorities.
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
works in a very different way, focusing bottom-up
country-level multi-stakeholder efforts to improve
transparency and accountability around the
management of revenues from natural resources.
EITI has established a core standard – a set of
requirements for the collection and reconciliation
of government reports of revenues received from
extractive industries and company reports of
payments made to the government. In 2014, the
standard will require disaggregated transaction
data by individual company, receiving country
entity, and individual project in addition to
revenue stream (EITI 2013).
Since the project level reporting requirements of
EITI are embedded in legal disclosure
requirements now in force in the USA and the
EU, Chinese companies listed on US and EU
stock exchanges will need to comply with such
reporting. There are more general reasons why
Chinese companies could be interested in being a
part of country-level EITI efforts, particularly for
reputational reasons if they are involved in
merger and acquisition deals in the commodities
sector, which are subject to approval procedures
and sometimes to public debate (Guo 2013). But
many find it difficult to communicate with
Chinese companies on EITI issues. Thus, it is
recommended that localised communication and
collaboration with national research institutes can
help to get buy-in from Chinese firms (Guo 2013).
3.4 Integrating the sustainable development concept
and tracking climate finance
Sustainable development is a crucial element in
China’s own path ahead, on all fronts, economic,
social and environmental, and a central priority
of the Chinese government, driven inter alia by air
pollution and scarcity of land, water and energy
resources. With a strong ongoing urbanisation
process, China is working hard on the concept of
smart, green cities and the integration of rural
migrants, and a more equal and just society with
financial integrity is also a top priority.
But China, together with other developing
countries, initially took a cautious approach to
the international agenda especially in the
context of a post-2015 development strategy that
makes sustainable development rather than
poverty reduction the key concept for post-2015.
There is concern that the UN discussion could
target, directly or indirectly, China’s own
development trajectory, with associated unduly
stringent reporting requirements that might
constrain its economic development. For China,
the implications of the post-2015 High Level
Panel call for a ‘data revolution’ could be far
reaching, although China is proposing to set
targets for itself in areas such as air pollution
(interview with Chinese officials 2013). Thus, in
principle it maintains that the international
community should ‘take eradicating poverty and
promoting development as the centrepiece of the
Development Agenda beyond 2015, and avoid an
overloaded agenda that may deviate from the
theme of development’ (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2013).
Nevertheless, China has taken a proactive stance
in negotiations on the post-2015 agenda and
signalled a heightened interest in global
governance by lending its support to a resolution
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of the UN General Assembly that embraced an
integrated set of poverty and sustainable
development goals (Ye and Fues 2014).
How in fact climate change finance is calculated
and monitored by the international community is
still to be agreed. The preparations for a UN
Agreement on a post-2015 development strategy
have moved significantly under the sustainable
development umbrella, following on from the
Rio+20 process. An Expert Committee on
Sustainable Development Financing has been
established along with a High Level Political
Forum, replacing the former Commission on
Sustainable Development. At the same time, the
21st session of the Conference of the Parties
(COP) to United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in
Paris in December 2015 is tasked with producing
a global post-2020 Climate Regime, with
financing provisions.
Regarding climate change financing, China has
so far regarded the commitment made at the
Copenhagen COP17 to organise US$100 billion
in annual public and private climate change
funding by 2020 as an obligation of the developed
countries. China is likely to continue to insist on
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China 2013). China’s participation in
international monitoring and reporting on
climate finance is thus uncertain, even though in
practice, Chinese solar and wind power
technologies and investments are likely to make
a significant contribution to climate finance in
the coming years (Jones 2013).
3.5 Mutual disciplines on trade finance
Aid has been used as a tool to promote trade.
This official financing instrument is a two-edged
sword. On the one hand, trade finance can help
to boost international competitiveness of
domestic companies. On the other hand, crass
competition among exporting countries can
result in a worse-off situation for all. Accordingly,
to overcome this collective action problem,
developed countries agreed on an export
financing discipline under the auspices of
OECD’s Export Credit Group (OECD 2011). It
is known as a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ for its
effectiveness depends on voluntary compliance of
participants (Moravcsik 1989).
China’s arrival as a major export-credit provider
has posed a challenge to this export-credit
discipline for as a non-OECD country China has
no obligation to apply these disciplines. The lack
of information on terms and conditions of China’s
export credits has heightened fears that China
has been undercutting everyone who is in
compliance with the OECD pact. However, from
the Chinese perspective, China maintains that as
a latecomer it is legitimate to support its
domestic firms at their early stage of ‘going
abroad’ as developed countries did in the 1970s
and 1980s. Thus, it has been reluctant to engage
in common export financing rules (interview with
decision-makers in China’s EximBank 2012).
This brings about the questions of (a) at what
point China would be willing to participate in a
multilateral framework, and (b) how the current
export-credit discipline can be adapted to attract
China to negotiating rules in a multilateral
context.
During President Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington
on 14 February 2012, China and the USA agreed
to open talks on setting guidelines for export-
credit financing. The two sides agreed to make
‘concrete progress towards a set of international
guidelines on the provision of official export
financing that, taking into account varying
national interests and situations, are consistent
with international best practices’ (Palmer 2012).
The announced objective was to reach agreement
on a new multilateral framework to govern
export credits to be completed by 2014. So far the
negotiations centre on the shipbuilding sector
with the participation of more than 20 countries.
There is no sign yet though of a negotiation on a
wider, more systemic front.
4 Conclusion
To come back to the central question posed in
this article, as to whether and how China might
engage in monitoring and reporting systems in
the area of development finance, two key points
of opportunity and challenge might be noted.
First, China’s emergence as a major source of
development finance, going far beyond its foreign
aid programme, has cultivated its strong interest
in the effective functioning of states and markets
in the developing world. This potentially creates
new incentives for China to join in the supply of
the public goods needed for strengthening global
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governance, including reporting and monitoring
systems for the various dimensions of
development finance covered in this article.
Second, China’s approach to development
finance, which involves close interaction between
states and markets for the provision of vision,
risk-taking and innovation, has put pressure on
the existing aid-focused RMS. In response, DAC
has already posed a broader concept of ‘total
official support for development’, serving as a
point of reference for all providers in the new
landscape of development finance. Such a public
entrepreneurship approach to development
finance could leverage different streams of
finance and capacities to meet challenges of
long-term finance provision. Yet, development
finance, if not well governed, could fall into the
pitfalls of debt crises in borrowing countries and
crass competition among creditors. Hence, global
RMSs are pivotal to harnessing successfully the
renaissance of public finance.
IDS Bulletin Volume 45  Number 4  July 2014 111
Notes
1 For the purpose of this study, we use a working
definition of ‘development finance,’ as agreed
upon in the landmark UN’s Monterrey
Consensus, with a special focus on
international financial resources including
both public and private sources (United
Nations 2003).
2 A particular feature of Chinese development
finance is that disbursements are made
directly to the Chinese firms and other
entities involved in implementation, thus
lowering corruption risks, but bypassing the
developing country financial administration
systems and thus the challenge of
contributing to their systemic financial
management and accountability capacities.
3 We select representative RMSs, and the list
here does not intend to be exhaustive. Future
research can extend to other RMSs.
4 www.ids.ac.uk/idsresearch/rising-powers-in-
international-development-programme. 
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